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Abstract 
Many studies have examined cost growth in DoD programs, yet little research has been done 
on the relationship between transaction costs and cost overruns. This study expands the 
work done by Biggs in 2013 to examine the relationship between transaction costs (using the 
SE/PM cost ratio as a proxy) and the likelihood of cost breaches experienced by a program. 
We do this in two ways. First we look at the data using a survival model to explore the 
relationship, which allows us to model the hazard of cost breaches over program maturity 
time. Second, we look at Nunn-McCurdy breaches as well as APB breaches. We find that 
higher SEPM ratios, either to date or estimated at completion, significantly increase the risk 
of both kinds of cost breaches in many models. In the models of APB breaches, a 1 
percentage point increase in estimated SEPM at completion increases the risk of breach by 
3–5%. The estimated impact is reduced in the model with to date SEPM, where it is about 2% 
when we do not control for contract type. Our results suggest that the SEPM ratio is a 
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Introduction 
Controlling cost growth for major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) has been 
problematic in the Department of Defense (DoD) for many years. A 2007 RAND study of 46 
weapons system programs in the DoD found an average of almost 50% cost growth from 
Milestone B (program initiation; Obaid Younossi et al., 2007, xvi). According to the GAO, 
active MDAPs in FY 2011 collectively experienced a cost growth of $74.4 billion (GAO, 
2011, 2).  
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) were introduced in 1967 to provide the DoD 
and the Congress a summary of the MDAP’s ability to meet cost, performance and schedule 
objectives. If a program exceeds an established cost threshold, a breach has occurred and 
the program manager must provide a brief explanation in the SAR of how or why the cost 
breach occurred. In 1981, Senator Samuel Nunn and Congressman David McCurdy 
introduced the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment (10 U.S.C. § 2433 2006) in an effort to control 
MDAP cost growth by holding the DoD accountable to Congress for management of 
program costs. The Nunn-McCurdy Amendment became law with the FY 1983 Department 
of Defense Authorization Act, which establishes consequences for MDAPs which exceed 
established cost thresholds.  
Many studies (e.g., Bolten et al., 2008) have examined cost growth in DoD 
programs, yet little research has been done on the relationship between transaction costs 
and cost overruns as suggested by Angelis et al. in 2008. A 2006 RAND study established 
that MDAP SE/PM costs vary between programs depending on the program type (Stem, 
Boito, & Younossi, 2006) and Angelis et al. (2008) suggested using the SE/PM cost as a 
proxy for transaction costs to examine the relationship between transaction costs and cost 
overruns. Biggs (2013) showed that as the EAC SE/PM cost ratio rises there is a statistically 
significant corresponding increase in the probability of a cost threshold breach occurring. 
This study examines transaction costs, a component of system cost that is not 
explicitly included in most cost estimates. To measure transaction costs, we will use a proxy 
measure first suggested by Angelis, et al. in 2008 that includes systems engineering (SE) 
and program management (PM) costs reported by MDAP contractors. A SE/PM ratio based 
on the total program cost is developed to allow comparison of transaction costs across 
different programs. It seems reasonable to assume that the SE/PM costs may increase as 
program managers respond to actual or anticipated increases in program costs. 
We look at the relationship between transaction costs and cost breaches in MDAPs 
initially reported by Biggs (2013) and seek to expand our understanding of this relationship 
by using survival analysis and considering whether cost breaches can be predicted by 
transaction costs. A better understanding of this relationship could lead to improved 
forecasting of cost breaches, which would be of great interest to both program managers 
and Congress.  
Cost Breaches in Major Defense Acquisitions Programs 
A cost breach is considered to occur when cost expenditures exceed the approved 
baseline cost estimate for an MDAP—also known as the acquisition program baseline 
(APB). The initial APB cost estimate is established early in the acquisition phase when there 
may be a considerable amount of uncertainty about specific requirements and technology. If 
an MDAP has been officially rebaselined cost breaches are measured relative to the current 
baseline.  
There are six categories of appropriations where cost breaches often occur: average 
procurement unit cost (APUC); program acquisition unit cost (PAUC); procurement; 
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research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E); military construction (MILCON); 
and acquisition-related operations and maintenance (O&M). Each of these cost breaches 
was included in the data set for this study.  
Nunn-McCurdy cost threshold breaches, or cost overruns, are based on original cost 
estimates for PAUC and APUC at project completion and in the case of a program which 
has rebaselined, cost threshold breaches are also based on the current (i.e., rebaselined) 
cost estimate for PAUC and APUC at project completion. For the purposes of this study, an 
APB cost breach is any cost breach reported in the SAR that is greater than or equal to 10% 
above the APB. Table 1 summarizes the types of breaches and their corresponding 
thresholds. 
 Nunn-McCurdy Cost Breach Thresholds 
 









Current Baseline  10% +15% +25% 
Original Baseline  N/A +30% +50% 
Figure 1 can be used to illustrate cost overrun calculations. The budgeted cost of 
work performed (BCWP) represents the total amount budgeted for work packages that are 
open or completed at any given point in time. The budgeted cost of work scheduled (BCWS) 
represents the total amount budgeted for the work that was scheduled for completion at a 
given point in time. The ACWP is the sum of actual costs that have been incurred to 
accomplish the work performed as of a point in time.  
 
 Earned Value Management 
(Defense Acquisition University, 2012) 
The Estimate at Completion (EAC) is the sum of the ACWP and the estimate to 
completion (ETC) for the remaining work. The ETC can be calculated using the cost 
performance index (CPI) and the schedule performance index (SPI). The formula for 
calculating ETC is 
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ETC	=	(BAC-BCWP)	/	(CPI*SPI      (1) 
When the EAC, a cost estimate for the total cost of the contract, is higher than the 
BAC, the baseline cost estimate of the contract, a cost overrun is projected. To calculate the 
expected cost overrun the current cost estimate must be revised to incorporate actual costs 
(ACWP). This adjusted EAC is then compared to the BAC, the acquisition program baseline 
for the contract. The percentage of cost overrun projected can be calculated using the 
following equation: 
Projected % Cost Overrun = 
EAC
BAC
 x 100 - 100   (2) 
Transaction Costs 
In general, a program has two types of costs: production costs and transaction costs. 
Production costs are usually captured in the WBS, but transaction costs may not be 
adequately captured in the WBS. Because traditional cost estimates are based on the 
production costs found in the WBS, they do not explicitly include transaction costs (Angelis 
et al., 2008). 
Transaction costs are the costs associated with “source selection, periodic 
competition and renegotiation, contract negotiation and management, performance 
measuring and monitoring and dispute resolutions” (Angelis et al., 2008). Transaction costs 
are driven by the complexity and riskiness of the work to be accomplished. There are three 
generally accepted categories of transaction costs: search and information costs; bargaining 
and decision costs; and policing and enforcement costs (Johnson, 2005). Although they are 
not often captured in the accounting records, the time and effort associated with these three 
types of transactions represent real costs to the organization.  
Transaction costs are difficult to measure because they are not easily identified and 
seldom captured in the accounting records. In previous research Angelis et al. (2008) 
examined how transaction costs might be captured in the cost estimates of DoD acquisition 
programs. Angelis, et al. identified a number of issues with DoD program management cost 
data reported for major weapon systems and found that it is not well suited for developing a 
cost model that includes transaction cost variables.  
As an alternate approach, they explored using contractor program management data 
from Cost Data Summary Reports (DD Form 1921) and suggested using the Systems 
Engineering/Program Management (SE/PM) category as a proxy for transaction costs. 
According to MIL-STD-881C, system engineering is defined as “the technical and 
management efforts of directing and controlling a totally integrated engineering effort of a 
system or program” and program management is defined as “the business and 
administrative planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and approval actions 
designated to accomplish overall program objectives, which are not associated with specific 
hardware elements and are not included in systems engineering” (DoD, 2011, 222). As such 
SE and PM seem to capture many of the activities typically related to transaction costs. 
The SE/PM Cost Ratio 
The SE/PM cost values used in this study are extracted from the WBS line item 
values for “SE/PM cost” which are listed on the Cost Data Summary Report (CDSR), DD 
Form 1921. The SE/PM cost to date is the total expended on SE/PM as of the report date. 
The EAC SE/PM cost is the projected SE/PM cost at contract completion. The SE/PM costs 
are inclusive of the total contract costs less the contractor’s profit/loss or fees. We note that 
the costs included in this category may differ from program to program and from contract to 
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contract due to subjective interpretations among contractors (and program managers) about 
the definition of SE/PM costs and non-uniform standards regarding which costs qualify to be 
categorized as SE/PM costs (Stem, Boito, & Younossi, 2006).  
This study uses the SE/PM cost ratio for a program, as shown in Equation 3: 
SE / PM	Cost Ratio	= 
SE /PM Costs
Total Costs
    (3) 
The numerator of the SE/PM cost ratio is the sum of SE and PM cost expenditures and the 
denominator is total program expenditures. A ratio is calculated to provide a perspective on 
the relative magnitude of SE/PM expenditures as well as to allow for comparison across 
different programs.  
Time and Risk 
Survival analysis uses “time at risk” as its relevant time metric. In this study we 
examine the risk of a cost breach over time. We measure “survival time” in terms of the 
maturity of the design and technology of the system, where program maturity is measured 
by the time elapsed since Milestone B, the entry point into the Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development phase. For a program to receive approval to begin Milestone B 
in the DoD, the design and technology associated with the system must be considered 
“mature.”1 
The type of contract used for a program is an indication of the perceived risk 
associated with the execution of the contract. As the level of performance risk increases, the 
risk of cost overruns also increases and the amount of cost risk that the contractor is willing 
to assume tends to decrease. Contract types differ in how the cost risk is shared between 
the government and the contractor. In a firm fixed-price contract there is no cost sharing 
between the government and the contractor and the contractor has full responsibility for the 
performance costs and resulting profit (or loss). In a cost-plus contract, a share ratio based 
on the contract cost and the contractor’s fee (profit) is negotiated so that the contractor has 
a pre-determined responsibility for the performance costs which will directly affect the fee 
(GSA, 2005). By including contract type in our analysis we can account for basic cost risk 
differences recognized by both the government and the contractor at the onset of the 
program. 
Hypothesis 
It seems reasonable to assume that programs with riskier contractual relationships 
will have higher transaction costs, since more time, effort and resources are expended to 
meet performance and schedule deadlines when compared to less risky contracts. If those 
transaction costs were not adequately included in the cost estimate then it is possible that a 
program with high transaction costs (as measured by the SE/PM ratio) would be more likely 
to experience cost overruns. Our hypothesis is that programs with higher SE/PM cost ratios 
are more likely to experience cost breaches than programs with lower SE/PM cost ratios.  
                                            
 
 
1 Milestone B approval authorizes an MDAP to enter the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase of 
the acquisition process. Statutory requirements for MDAPs to achieve Milestone B approval are found in Title 10 
U.S.C. § 2366b. 
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 Cost Breach Influence Diagram  
(Biggs, 2013) 
The influence diagram in Figure 2 describes the interactions between factors which 
may be associated with the occurrence of a cost breach. The dashed lines in Figure 2 
represent factors that must be dealt with qualitatively or by using proxies. The solid lines 
represent factors that can be quantitatively evaluated. While the risk and complexity of a 
program may directly contribute to a cost overrun, the SE/PM efforts and the contract type 
can influence the magnitude and frequency of cost overruns as measured by cost breaches.  
Figure 2 indicates that the risk and complexity of the MDAP will guide program 
managers and contractors in their selection of an appropriate contract type which in turn can 
influence the government’s exposure to cost overruns. It is also likely that the risk and 
complexity of a program will drive the level of monitoring and negotiation (transaction costs) 
required to manage the program and that riskier, more complex programs will require higher 
levels of transaction costs which may contribute to cost overruns. 
In this study we will examine how the SE/PM ratio and contract type are related to 
the probability of incurring an APB or Nunn-McCurdy cost breach over time. Our assumption 
is that programs with higher SE/PM cost ratios are in riskier contractual relationships and 
have higher transaction costs and will have a higher probability of cost breaches than those 
programs with lower SE/PM cost ratios.  
Data  
This study used two different data sources: selected acquisition reports (SAR) and 
the cost and software data reporting system (CSDR). The SAR contains details of critical 
parameters of an MDAP including threshold breaches, schedule, performance, current 
contracts and cost details. MDAPs typically require several contracts to be executed, often 
concurrently and SARs provide information for the overall program and not for individual 
contracts. A SAR may list a single contract or many contracts for a single MDAP. Because 
threshold breaches are associated with contract estimates, only MDAPs which listed a 
single contract in the “Contracts” section of the SAR were selected for our study. In addition 
to cost threshold breaches, the SAR indicates the time since program initiation at Milestone 
B, which was used in this study to indicate program maturity.  
The program cost data found in the DD Form 1921 (Cost Data Summary Report, 
CDSR) provided by the Defense Cost and Resource Center (DCARC) in the Defense 
Automated Cost Information Management System (DACIMS) database contains significantly 
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more contract detail than the SARs. The work breakdown structure (WBS) format of the 
CDSR allows us to obtain information on SE and PM costs. To simplify the data collection 
process, only the cost data provided by the prime contractor was recorded for further 
analysis. The type of contract used for the program was also obtained from the CDSRs. 
Programs were noted as having either firm fixed price type contracts or cost-plus type 
contracts.  
A total of 32 MDAPs representing Air Force, Army, Navy, and Joint programs since 
1988 were included in this study and are listed in the appendix. Descriptive statistics for the 
data are shown in Table 2. Note that each program had several years of observations. 
 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
APB Breach 84 0.3095238 0.4650739 0 1 
NM Breach 84 0.1071429 0.3111524 0 1 
SEPM – EAC 84 15.18071 11.88479 0.15 49.75 
SEPM – To Date 78 16.47692 15.95705 0 87 
Type (0 = Fixed) 78 0.525641 0.5025741 0 1 
Methodology 
This study expands the work done by Biggs in 2013 to determine the nature of any 
potential relationship between transaction costs (using the SE/PM cost ratio as a proxy) and 
the likelihood of cost breaches experienced by a program. We do this in two ways. First we 
look at the data using a survival model to explore the relationship, which allows us to model 
the hazard of cost breaches over program maturity time.  
Second, we look at Nunn-McCurdy breaches. Cost breaches result when the amount 
of the cost overrun exceeds certain parameters defined by regulation. There are two types 
of cost breaches: APB and Nunn-McCurdy breaches. In order for a program to incur an APB 
breach estimated program expenditures must be greater than the APB estimate at 
completion (EAC) by at least 10%. If the difference is 15% or more, it is a Nunn-McCurdy 
breach. Biggs looked at APB breaches. In this study we look at both APB and Nunn-
McCurdy breaches separately since Nunn-McCurdy breaches have more serious 
consequences for program managers.  
Both APB cost breaches and Nunn-McCurdy cost breaches are considered the 
binary-outcome dependent variable in this analysis: cost breach or no cost breach in a given 
year of program maturity. There are two explanatory variables that were included in the 
analysis: EAC SE/PM cost ratio and program contract type (fixed price or cost-plus). While 
the exact nature of the relationship between cost threshold breaches and these explanatory 
variables is unknown, it is reasonable to suppose that the explanatory variables influence 
the cost performance of the MDAPs as shown in Figure 2. 
Using survival analysis we construct a hazard function for cost breaches. Our 
analysis builds on Biggs (2013) which used a population averaged logit to look differences in 
probability of program failure. While the logit is a good starting point to estimate the 
probability of a cost breach some time during a program’s development, the survival model 
complements this analysis, allowing for multiple breaches over time, and allowing us to 
estimate how the hazard of cost breaches varies with our explanatory variables. Hazard 
models are also more tolerant of gaps and censoring and can be thought of as conditional 
logits (Cleves et al., 2010). 
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In this analysis, we use the Cox-Relative Hazard. It is considered semi-parametric 
because it does not imply a specific functional form on the hazard of breaches over time. 
The proportional hazard model is specified as 
h 	 t 	 h t exp x β      (4) 
Equation 4 states that the hazard a particular subject j faces at time t is a function of the 
baseline hazard modified proportionally by the vector of regression coefficients β . The Cox 
model does not estimate the baseline hazard. We can convert coefficients from these 
regressions to hazard ratios to understand the marginal effect on the baseline hazard of a 
change in the coefficient. This is done simply by calculating the exponent of the coefficient 
and using as a multiplier (e.g., a 0.9 would be a 10% reduction, and 1.1 would be a 10% 
increase.) While we report coefficients, we offer interpretation from the exponentiated 
hazard ratios. 
Results 
For the 32 programs included in this study, Figures 3 and 4 show the cumulative risk 
of APB and Nunn-McCurdy breaches over program maturity. Despite not having greatly 
disparate thresholds, there were far more APB breaches in our sample, with 26 program-
years with APB breaches and only 9 program-years with NM breaches.  
 
 Cumulative Risk of APB Breach 
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 Cumulative Risk of Nunn-McCurdy Breach 
Table 3 shows the results for Hazard models for APB Breaches and Table 4 shows 
the results for Nunn-McCurdy breaches. We find that higher SEPM ratios, either to date or 
estimated at completion, significantly increase risk of both kinds of cost breaches in many 
models. In the models of APB breaches, a 1 percentage point increase in estimated SEPM 
at completion increases the risk of breach by 3–5%. The estimated impact is reduced in the 
model with to date SEPM, where it is about 2% when we do not control for contract type. 
 APB Breach Hazard 
Model 
SEPM – EAC SEPM – To Date  








  0.0229** 0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) 
 
   1.424*** 
   (0.52) 
Observations 84 84 78 78 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1 
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 Nunn-McCurdy Hazard 
Model 
SEPM – EAC SEPM – To Date  










    1.23 
    (0.92) 
Observations 84 84 78 78 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1 
SEPM is only a significant predictor of Nunn-McCurdy breaches in one of the 
models. In the model where we do not control for contract type, Nunn-McCurdy breaches 
are about 4% more likely per one percentage point increase in SEPM estimate at 
completion. The result is significant at the 10% level.  
Looking at the impact of contract type, cost-plus models are, unsurprisingly, more 
likely to experience cost breaches than fixed price contracts. In the case APB breaches, 
cost-plus programs are two to three times more likely to experience a cost breach. In the 
case of Nunn-McCurdy breaches, the result is never statistically significant though it is of a 
similar magnitude.  
Conclusion 
In this study we expand the work done by Biggs (2013) using survival analysis to 
consider whether transaction costs as measured by the SEPM cost ratio can help predict 
cost breaches in major acquisition programs. We estimate how the hazard of cost breaches 
varies with SEPM and contract type. Our results confirm previous findings that as the EAC 
SE/PM cost ratio rises there is a statistically significant corresponding increase in the 
probability of a cost threshold breach occurring. We find a similar relationship when we look 
at SEPM to date. 
Interestingly, we find less statistically significant evidence that the SEPM ratio is 
related to the likelihood of a Nunn-MuCurdy breach. This may be due to the considerable 
penalties associated with a Nunn-McCurdy breach leading to significant efforts by program 
managers to avoid such breaches. If this is the case, then we are likely to see SEPM ratios 
increase as more resources are expended to avoid a Nunn-McCurdy breach and if those 
efforts are successful, no breach will occur.  
It seems reasonable to assume that higher SEPM ratios can be associated with 
more complex and risky programs. Our results suggest that the SEPM ratio is a promising 
measure of the likelihood that such programs will experience a cost breach. To be clear, the 
SEPM ratio is a symptom and not a cause of cost breaches, much like the temperature of a 
patient does not cause the disease. As such, program managers and others interested in 
controlling cost growth in DoD programs should consider using the SEPM ratio as an early 
indicator of the risk of a cost breach. 
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Appendix 
Programs Selected for Study 
Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar 
AIM-9X/Short Range Air-to-Air Missile 
AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) 
Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System (AMF JTRS) 
AN/WQR-3, Advanced Deployable System (ADS) 
Apache Block IIIA Remanufacture (AB3A REMANUFACTURE) 
AV-8B/Attack, V/STOL, Close Air Support (Harrier II+ Remanufacture) 
B-2 Radar Modernization Program 
Cobra Judy Replacement (Cobra Judy Replacement) 
EA-18G Growler (EA-18G) 
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) 
E-3 AWACS Radar System Improvement Program (RSIP) 
E-2C Reproduction 
Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) 
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) 
Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System/DPICM/Unitary/Alternative Warhead 
 (GMLRS/GMLRS AW) 
Joint Common Missile (JCM) 
Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (formerly Cluster 1) 
 (JTRS  GMR) 
Longbow Hellfire—subsystem of the AH-64 Apache Weapon System 
LHA Replacement Amphibious Assault Ship 
MQ-4C Unmanned Aircraft System Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (MQ-4C 
 UAS BAMS) 
Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) 
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) 
Presidential Helicopter Replacement (VH-71) Program 
P-8A Poseidon 
Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM) 
Small Diameter Bomb Increment II (SDB II) 
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Program 
Standard Missile (SM)–2 Block IV 
Stryker Family of Vehicles (STRYKER) 
UH-72A Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) 
Warfighter Information Network–Tactical (WIN-T) 
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